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A Right Without a Rights-Holder Is Hollow: Introduction to OHLJ’s Special Issue 
on Identifying Rights-Bearing Aboriginal Peoples 
Abstract 
The focus of this special issue of the Osgoode Hall Law Journal is on identifying holders of rights which 
are recognized and affirmed by section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. While Canadian and provincial 
governments and industry proponents have assumed that Indian Act bands are section 35 rights-holders, 
Kent McNeil’s analysis of the relevant jurisprudence reveals that this issue is to be resolved with reference 
to Aboriginal peoples’ own laws. As such, the assumption that a section 35 rights-holder must possess an 
overarching governance structure is unwarranted if the relevant Aboriginal people’s own laws are not 
grounded in positivism. Naiomi Metallic’s incisive critique demonstrates that the reasoning in R v Bernard 
was captured by precisely this type of positivist assumption when the court held that smaller Mìgmaq 
collectives—as opposed to the larger Mìgmaq nation—must be the rights-holder because the larger 
Mìgmaq nation lacked a ‘Super Chief’. Gordon Christie identifies another form of capture within the 
section 35 jurisprudence: Aboriginal peoples are presumed to be socio-cultural bodies and not political 
bodies, and Aboriginal rights are presumed to be cultural activities and not governmental powers to 
exercise jurisdictional authority. Both presumptions are captured by liberalism and neither is supported by 
the text or by a purposive interpretation of section 35(1). Sara Mainville’s article uncovers a conflict 
between Canadian and Indigenous law in the context of a Kelly order, which courts characterize as a 
practical solution to the dilemma of how to identify the rights-holder on an interlocutory motion. Mainville 
demonstrates that the adversarial effects of a Kelly order contravene the Anishinaabe legal principle of 
consensus-building. Perhaps unsurprisingly given these various conflicts between Canadian 
jurisprudence and Indigenous laws, Paul Chartrand argues that the identity of rights-holders should be 
decided through political negotiations between political actors, and not by the courts. Similarly, Jason 
Madden argues that the Supreme Court of Canada’s jurisprudence entails a duty on Canadian and 
provincial governments to negotiate with an Aboriginal people to identify the proper rights-holder when a 
prima facie Aboriginal right exists. In these ways, the articles in this special issue make valuable 
contributions to ongoing discussions about identifying section 35 rights-holders. 
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The focus of this special issue of the Osgoode Hall Law Journal is on identifying holders of 
rights which are recognized and affirmed by section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. While 
Canadian and provincial governments and industry proponents have assumed that Indian 
Act bands are section 35 rights-holders, Kent McNeil’s analysis of the relevant jurisprudence 
reveals that this issue is to be resolved with reference to Aboriginal peoples’ own laws. 
As such, the assumption that a section 35 rights-holder must possess an overarching 
governance structure is unwarranted if the relevant Aboriginal people’s own laws are not 
grounded in positivism. Naiomi Metallic’s incisive critique demonstrates that the reasoning 
in R v Bernard was captured by precisely this type of positivist assumption when the court 
held that smaller Mìgmaq collectives—as opposed to the larger Mìgmaq nation—must be 
the rights-holder because the larger Mìgmaq nation lacked a ‘Super Chief’. Gordon Christie 
identifies another form of capture within the section 35 jurisprudence: Aboriginal peoples 
are presumed to be socio-cultural bodies and not political bodies, and Aboriginal rights are 
presumed to be cultural activities and not governmental powers to exercise jurisdictional 
authority. Both presumptions are captured by liberalism and neither is supported by the 
text or by a purposive interpretation of section 35(1). Sara Mainville’s article uncovers a 
conflict between Canadian and Indigenous law in the context of a Kelly order, which courts 
characterize as a practical solution to the dilemma of how to identify the rights-holder on 
an interlocutory motion. Mainville demonstrates that the adversarial effects of a Kelly order 
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contravene the Anishinaabe legal principle of consensus-building. Perhaps unsurprisingly 
given these various conflicts between Canadian jurisprudence and Indigenous laws, Paul 
Chartrand argues that the identity of rights-holders should be decided through political 
negotiations between political actors, and not by the courts. Similarly, Jason Madden argues 
that the Supreme Court of Canada’s jurisprudence entails a duty on Canadian and provincial 
governments to negotiate with an Aboriginal people to identify the proper rights-holder when 
a prima facie Aboriginal right exists. In these ways, the articles in this special issue make 
valuable contributions to ongoing discussions about identifying section 35 rights-holders. 
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I. WHO ARE “THE ABORIGINAL PEOPLES OF CANADA”? 
SECTION 35(1) OF THE Constitution Act, 1982, recognizes and afrms the 
“existing [A]boriginal and treaty rights of the [A]boriginal peoples of Canada.”1 
Te overarching question guiding this special issue is: Who are “the [A]boriginal 
peoples of Canada”?2 Answering this question at a high level of generality 
is straightforward: Section 35(2) clarifes that the “‘[A]boriginal peoples of 
Canada’  includes the Indian, Inuit and Métis peoples of Canada.”3 Given that 
both provisions refer to “peoples” in the plural, it is unsurprising that the Supreme 
Court of Canada (“SCC”) consistently afrms the collective nature of section 
1. Constitution Act, 1982, s 35(1), being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, 
c 11 [Constitution Act, 1982]. 
2. I generally use the term “Indigenous” except when “Aboriginal” is more accurate, such as 
when referring to rights and rights-holders pursuant to section 35. 
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35(1) rights.4 Generally speaking, the rights-holder is the relevant Aboriginal 
people, or in other words, the collective. Granted, the Court has left open the 
possibility that section 35(1) rights might have not only a collective but also an 
individual aspect, for example, insofar as an Aboriginal individual may have an 
entitlement to exercise an Aboriginal or treaty right.5 Tat being said, our focus 
in this issue is on delineating the relevant rights-holding collective. 
Once we take up the more specifc task of identifying particular Aboriginal 
peoples, our project becomes more complex. As John Borrows explains, Indigenous 
peoples’ identities have been “fractured and reconfgured” by Canadian law and 
policy,6 most notably, for example, by the imposition of foreign governance 
structures—such as Indian Act bands, Inuit hamlets, and Métis settlements— 
over Indigenous peoples’ own forms of governance.7 However, this imposition 
“has been partial and incomplete. Older Indigenous identities intermingle 
with imposed, invented or reformulated identities.”8 As a result, the competing 
governance orders giving rise to an Indigenous people’s identity may be difuse, 
centralized, contested and ambiguous.9 Tus, processes of colonialism are at least 
partly responsible for the complexity of Indigenous peoples’ identities. An equally 
important consideration is the sophistication and nuance of Indigenous 
peoples’ own laws and governance. Te political and governance systems of 
many Indigenous peoples are fuid and/or multi-leveled. As such, the manner 
of identifying the proper rights-holder can difer between diferent Indigenous 
peoples. Even within a single Indigenous people, the identity of the rights-holder 
can vary according to context and shift over time. 
If an Indigenous people’s legal and governance processes are assumed 
to be simplistic and one-dimensional, then complexity is encountered as 
4. Behn v Moulton Contracting Ltd, 2013 SCC 26 at paras 30, 33 [Behn]; R v Sappier; R v Gray, 
2006 SCC 54 at paras 26, 31; R v Marshall, [1999] 3 SCR 533 at paras 17, 37 [Marshall]; 
R v Sundown, [1999] 1 SCR 393 at para 36; Delgamuukw v British Columbia, [1997] 3 SCR 
1010 at para 115 [Delgamuukw]; R v Sparrow, [1990] 1 SCR 1075 at 1078, 1112 [Sparrow]. 
5. Behn, supra note 4 at paras 33, 35. 
6. John Borrows, “Wise Practices in Indigenous Economic Development and Environmental 
Protection” in Robert Hamilton et al, eds, Wise Practices: Exploring Indigenous Economic 
Justice and Self-Determination (University of Toronto Press) [forthcoming in 2021], 
manuscript at 10 [Borrows, “Wise Practices”]. 
7. Ibid. 
8. Ibid. 
9. Ibid. See also Gordon Christie, “Potential Aboriginal Rights-holders: Canada and Cultural 
Communities versus Indigenous Peoples and Socio-political Bodies” (2020) 57 Osgoode 
Hall LJ 1 at 6 (describing the complexity amongst First Nations, bands, tribal councils, and 
Indigenous nations). 












an unwarranted obstacle instead of as the norm, which is how complexity is 
experienced within Canadian governance generally.10 Borrows highlights the 
intricacy of Canada’s governance system insofar as various political collectives are 
organized along at least three diferent scales: municipal, provincial/territorial, 
and federal.11 Not surprisingly then, the identity of the Crown—the duty-holder 
who corresponds to a section 35(1) rights-holder—is also often contested.12 
Moreover, no one expects consensus or unanimity either across or within any 
of Canada’s three scales of representation. Municipal, provincial/territorial, and 
federal governments routinely disagree with one another, as do various political 
parties, councilors, and other representatives within each level of government. 
Indigenous peoples should not be held to a higher standard of consensus, and 
certainly not to an impossible standard.13 
Tat said, internal calls for consensus grounded in an Indigenous people’s 
own laws are valuable in that they help to parse the layers of complexity and thus 
to facilitate the process of identifying an Aboriginal people. For example, Sara 
Mainville’s contribution to this issue discusses the processes adopted by Grand 
Council Treaty Tree for ensuring the Anishinaabe Nation of the Boundary 
Waters is “of one mind” in its decision making, as well as the ways in which these 
processes are grounded in miinigoziiwin, the inherent authority given by the 
Creator to the Anishinaabe Nation of the Boundary Waters.14 At the same time, 
we must guard against a pan-Indigenous approach, which erroneously assumes all 
Indigenous peoples are a homogenous monolith. Not all Indigenous peoples use 
consensus-based decision making. Tus, some external critiques of an Aboriginal 
people’s lack of unanimity may be grounded not in Indigenous peoples’ own 
laws but in proponents’ own desires for certainty in determining with whom to 
10. See Linda Tuhiwai Smith, Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples, 2nd ed
(Otago University Press, 2012) at 77. 
11. Borrows, “Wise Practices,” supra note 6 at 11. 
12. See e.g. Shin Imai & Ashley Stacey, “Municipalities and the Duty to Consult Aboriginal 
Peoples: A Case Comment on Neskonlith Indian Band v Salmon Arm (City)” (2014) 47 UBC 
L Rev 293; Tomas McMorrow, “Upholding the Honour of the Crown” (2018) 35 Windsor 
YB Access Just 311. 
13. Similarly, as Naiomi Metallic notes in her article in this issue, the Supreme Court of Canada 
“has signalled on several occasions that reconciliation means avoiding approaches that would 
entail impossible evidentiary burdens.” Naiomi Metallic, “Searching for ‘Superchief ’ and 
Other Fictional Indians: A Narrative and Case Comment on R v Bernard, 2017 NBCA 48” 
(2020) 57 Osgoode Hall LJ 230 at 247. 
14. Sara Mainville, “Hunting Down a Lasting Relationship with Canada – Will UNDRIP 
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consult.15 We can consider whether such approaches apply stereotypes and erase 
the complexity of Indigenous laws and governance. 
As Kent McNeil recognizes in his contribution to this issue, other than 
sections 35(1) and 35(2), the current provisions of the Constitution Act, 1982
provide no further guidance on defning the section 35(1) rights-holder and 
so it has fallen to either the courts or the parties to craft a resolution through 
negotiations.16 Paul Chartrand, in this issue, reminds us that negotiation was 
initially the favoured approach.17 Sections 37 and 37.1 of the Constitution 
Act, 1982 provided for constitutional conferences on the “identifcation and 
defnition” of section 35 rights with representatives of Aboriginal peoples and 
federal, provincial, and territorial leaders.18 Tese conferences resulted in little 
agreement, and as Chartrand reports based on his participation in the conferences, 
the question of identifying section 35 rights-holders was generally ignored.19 
Of course, the parties can still resolve this issue through negotiations. 
Jason Madden’s contribution to this special issue argues that the SCC’s section 
35 jurisprudence entails a Crown duty to negotiate with an Indigenous 
people about how to identify the rights-holder.20 Tis approach is consistent 
with reconciliation, the central purpose and “frst principle”21 of section 35, 
as consistently afrmed by the SCC.22 Given the Court’s notoriously nebulous 
reconciliation jurisprudence, commentary abounds on what this term does or 
15. See e.g. Aidan Macnab, “Indigenous Law Experts Weigh in on the Wet’Suwet’en Protests,” 
Canadian Lawyer (25 February 2020), online: <www.canadianlawyermag.com/practice-areas/ 
indigenous/indigenous-law-experts-weigh-in-on-the-wetsuweten-protests/326702> [perma. 
cc/854C-2E2G] (particularly Roy Millen’s comments). 
16. Kent McNeil, “Aboriginal Rights and Indigenous Governance: Identifying the Holders of 
Rights and Authority” (2020) 57 Osgoode Hall LJ 127 at 128. 
17. Paul Chartrand, “Rethinking the Doctrine of Aboriginal Rights: Te Métis Cases” (2020) 57 
Osgoode Hall LJ 173 at 174. 
18. Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 1, ss 37, 37.1. 
19. Chartrand, supra note 17 at 174, n 4. 
20. Jason Madden, “Te Re-Emergence of One of the Previously Slayed Métis Rights-Denial 
Dragons: A Comment on the Dangers and Duplicity in Fort Chipewyan Métis Nation of 
Alberta Local #125 v. Alberta,” (2020) 57 Osgoode Hall LJ 195 at 200-201. 
21. Mikisew Cree First Nation v Canada (Governor General in Council), 2018 SCC 40 at para 22, 
Karakatsanis J. 
22. Lax Kw’alaams Indian Band v Canada (AG), 2011 SCC 56 at para 12; Mikisew Cree First 
Nation v Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), 2005 SCC 69 at para 1; R v Van der Peet, 
[1996] 2 SCR 507 at para 31 [Van der Peet]. 










should mean.23 Whatever else “reconciliation” might mean, it arguably calls 
for a non-adversarial relationship between Indigenous peoples and the Crown. 
For example, the Court in Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia explains that 
the “governing ethos” of section 35 “is not one of competing interests but of 
reconciliation.”24 Te inherently adversarial nature of our justice system means 
only a negotiated—rather than court-imposed—solution is consistent with 
reconciliation.25 
Mainville highlights the potential promise of the federal government’s recent 
litigation directive as a means of avoiding the pitfalls of litigating the issue of 
identifying section 35 rights-holders.26 Litigation Guideline #15 of the document 
directs the federal government to take a “large and liberal approach … to the 
question of who is the proper rights holder” and seems to recognize the value of 
a non-litigious approach: “Canada respects the right of Indigenous peoples and 
nations to defne themselves and counsel’s pleadings and other submissions must 
respect the proper rights-bearing collective.”27 And yet, litigation on the issue of 
identifying the rights-holder continues. Te SCC has granted leave to appeal 
in R v Desautel.28 Mr. Desautel is a member of the Lakes Tribe of the Colville 
Confederated Tribes, which forms a part of the Sinixt people.29 Sinixt traditional 
territory spans the Canada–US border, extending north into British Columbia 
23. For discussions of the meaning of “reconciliation,” see Aimée Craft, “Neither Infringement 
nor Justifcation: Te Supreme Court of Canada’s Mistaken Approach to Reconciliation” 
in Karen Drake & Brenda L Gunn, eds, Renewing Relationships: Indigenous Peoples and 
Canada (Wiyasiwewin Mikiwahp Native Law Centre, 2019) 59; Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission of Canada, Canada’s Residential Schools: Reconciliation: Te Final Report of 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, vol 6 (McGill-Queen’s University 
Press, 2015) [TRC Final Report]; Mark D Walters, “Te Jurisprudence of Reconciliation: 
Aboriginal Rights in Canada” in Will Kymlicka & Bashir Bashir, eds, Te Politics of 
Reconciliation in Multicultural Societies (Oxford University Press, 2008) 165. 
24. Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia, 2014 SCC 44 at para 17 [Tsilhqot’in Nation SCC]. 
25. Felix Hoehn, “Te Duty to Negotiate and the Ethos of Reconciliation” (2020) 83 
Sask L Rev 1 at 2. 
26. Mainville, supra note 14 at 106. 
27. Canada, Department of Justice, Te Attorney General of Canada’s Directive on Civil 
Litigation Involving Indigenous Peoples (Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 
2018), online: <www.justice.gc.ca/eng/csj-sjc/ijr-dja/dclip-dlcpa/litigation-litiges.html> 
[perma.cc/P848-WPH5]. 
28. R v Desautel, 2019 BCCA 151 [Desautel CA], leave to appeal to SCC granted, 38734 (24 
October 2019) [Desautel Leave to SCC Granted]. Although the federal government is 
not a party in this case, it is an intervenor. Tis case is discussed by Kent McNeil in his 
contribution to this special issue. See supra note 16 at 163-167. 
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and south into Washington State.30 Mr. Desautel is neither a resident nor a 
citizen of Canada; he lives on the Colville Indian Reserve in Washington State.31 
While hunting in the portion of Sinixt territory located in British Columbia, 
he shot an elk and was charged with hunting without a licence and without 
being a resident of British Columbia, in violation of British Columbia’s Wildlife 
Act.32 Mr. Desautel argues his actions were protected by section 35(1). Tis case 
raises the issue of whether an Indigenous people who are no longer resident in 
Canada, and whose members are not Canadian citizens, can have section 35 
Aboriginal rights. 
Te articles in this special issue provide guidance on all of these topics. Part 
II of this introduction, below, examines the current law on identifying a section 
35 rights-holder. It summarizes Kent McNeil’s contribution, which synthesizes 
the existing jurisprudence and concludes that the rights-holder is to be identifed 
in accordance with an Indigenous people’s own law. Tis section also analyzes 
the text of section 35 which indicates rights-holders are political entities with 
governmental powers such as jurisdiction and law-making authority. In contrast, 
as Gordon Christie’s article illustrates, the SCC’s jurisprudence conceptualizes 
section 35 rights-holders as mere socio-cultural bodies, in accordance with the 
commitments of liberalism. In other words, the Court’s jurisprudence succumbs 
to constitutional capture. Aaron Mills explains constitutional capture as the 
violence that results when one legal order is understood not through the lens of 
its own lifeworld and constitutionalism, but rather is translated through the logic 
of a diferent constitutionalism.33 Te Court’s jurisprudence flters Aboriginal 
rights through the lens of liberal constitutionalism. Part III discusses Naiomi 
Metallic’s article, which uncovers the errors within the courts’ analyses in R v 
Bernard. Most signifcantly, Metallic shows that the lower courts misstate the 
SCC’s Aboriginal rights test by inventing a community-occupation-continuity 
requirement. Given the concerns highlighted by Metallic, this newly invented 
requirement should not be adopted in Desautel. Te analysis of the courts in R 
v Bernard is also captured by legal positivism. Next, Part IV examines potential 
challenges when identifying a rights-holder in accordance with Indigenous law. 
Sara Mainville’s article illustrates the challenge that arises when a court and 
Crown litigants refuse to defer to Indigenous law. Te result is an unnecessarily 
30. R v Desautel, 2017 BCPC 84 at paras 20-21. 
31. Desautel CA, supra note 28 at para 4. 
32. Ibid at para 5. 
33. Aaron James Mills (Waabishki Ma’iingan), Miinigowiziwin: All Tat Has Been Given 
for Living Well Together: One Vision of Anishinaabe Constitutionalism (PhD Dissertation, 
University of Victoria, 2019) [unpublished] at 14, 24. 









adversarial approach which obstructs reconciliation. Part V considers who should 
determine the identity of the rights-holder. Many contributors highlight the folly 
of judicializing this issue. Paul Chartrand advocates for an approach based on 
consent and negotiations between Indigenous peoples and the executive branch 
of the Canadian government. According to Jason Madden, the SCC’s section 
35 jurisprudence supports this approach; and yet, as Madden illustrates, the 
Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench has failed to uphold this jurisprudence. Finally, 
the conclusion considers the need for mandatory education on Indigenous and 
Aboriginal legal issues within law school curricula, given the concerns raised by 
the contributions to this special issue. Although Adrien Habermacher’s article 
was not part of the workshop that led to this special issue, it makes a valuable 
contribution to this discussion insofar as it reveals the rationales underlying some 
faculty members’ resistance to including Indigenous and Aboriginal legal issues 
within law school curricula. 
II. HOW TO IDENTIFY THE RIGHTS-HOLDER 
Although the Supreme Court of Canada has not yet explicitly addressed the topic, 
lower courts have been contending with whether a larger Indigenous nation or 
smaller sub-entities within that nation are the rights-holders. As Gordon Christie 
explains, framing the question in this way as merely one of community scale can 
be superfcial.34 In some cases, the smaller entities at issue—such as family groups, 
clans, houses, and so on—are aspects of the Indigenous peoples’ own political 
system.35 In other cases, smaller entities—such as the Indian Act bands, Inuit 
hamlets, and Métis settlements discussed above—are state-imposed attempts to 
dismember and replace Indigenous political bodies.36 Part II(A), below, critically 
examines the common assumption that Indian Act bands are rights-holders. Part 
II(B) outlines Kent McNeil’s synthesis of the jurisprudence, which establishes that 
the identity of the rights-holder is determined in accordance with an Indigenous 
people’s own laws about its collective identity. Te third sub-section, Part II(C), 
examines the text of section 35, which identifes rights-holders as “peoples,” 
a term commonly understood to denote political entities who are entitled to 
exercise governmental authority such as jurisdiction. Te plain meaning of the 
text contrasts sharply with the SCC’s jurisprudence which implicitly characterizes 
Aboriginal peoples as mere socio-cultural entities, as Christie reveals. Part II(D) 
undertakes a purposive analysis of section 35. It concludes that the purpose of 
34. Christie, supra note 9 at 9-11. 
35. Ibid at 9. 
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section 35 is to reconcile Aboriginal peoples with Canada’s de facto control of 
Aboriginal peoples’ lands. Tis analysis is consistent with the plain text, according 
to which section 35 rights-holders are “peoples.” 
A. IS THE INDIAN ACT BAND THE PROPER RIGHTS-HOLDER? 
Industry proponents, media outlets, members of the public, and even government 
representatives often assume state-imposed entities such as Indian Act bands 
are the proper rights-holders.37 For example, government representatives and 
industry proponents often attempt to consult with band councils in order to 
fulfll their duty to consult and accommodate prior to carrying out projects that 
impact section 35 rights.38 Tis issue recently entered public consciousness with 
Coastal GasLink’s plan to put a pipeline through the territory of the Wet’suwet’en 
nation. Band councils of the Wet’suwet’en nation signed agreements with Coastal 
GasLink, while the hereditary chiefs of the Wet’suwet’en nation opposed the 
project.39 Some commentary on traditional and social media assumed the band 
councils—and not the Wet’suwet’en hereditary chiefs—represented the proper 
rights-holders, and thus proponents and government representatives were only 
obligated to consult and accommodate band councils.40 Commentators also 
assumed the band councils consented to the project given their agreements 
with Coastal GasLink, and thus Coastal GasLink’s consultation must have been 
sufcient.41 Are any of these assumptions correct? 
Before focusing on the question of identifying the rights-holder, we can 
examine the fnal assumption listed above, namely, that entering into an agreement 
with an industry proponent demonstrates the consent of the Indigenous signatory. 
In a careful study of impact beneft agreements, Dayna Nadine Scott exposes the 
faulty logic underlying this assumption.42 Tese agreements are executed in the 
37. Dayna Nadine Scott, “Extraction Contracting: Te Struggle for Control of Indigenous 
Lands” (2020) 119 South Atlantic Q 269 at 275. 
38. Christie, supra note 9 at 3-4, 9. 
39. Macnab, supra note 15. 
40. See e.g. Stephen LeDrew, “Canada Should Enforce the Law with Wet’Suwet’en Anti-pipeline 
Protests,” National Post (11 February 2020), online: <nationalpost.com/opinion/ 
stephen-ledrew-canada-should-enforce-the-law-with-wetsuweten-anti-pipeline-protests> 
[perma.cc/Z8T8-KAFS]. For opposing views, see Shiri Pasternack, “No, those who defend 
the Wet’suwet’en Territory are not criminals,” Te Globe and Mail (15 January 2020), 
online: <www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-no-those-who-defend-the-wetsuweten-
territory-are-not-criminals> [perma.cc/NRV6-Z4XU]; Kent McNeil, “Pipeline protests and 
the rule of law,” Vancouver Sun (22 February 2020), online: <vancouversun.com/opinion/ 
kent-mcneil-pipeline-protests-and-the-rule-of-law> [perma.cc/B22V-M9DV]. 
41. See e.g. LeDrew, supra note 40. 
42. Scott, supra note 37 at 273. 













shadow of the law, which in this context contains a structural power imbalance: 
Current Canadian doctrinal law on asserted but not yet established rights denies 
a veto to the Aboriginal rights-holder, but provides a veto to the state.43 Scott 
documents the views of Indigenous leaders who do not consent to projects and 
yet they enter into impact beneft agreements. Tey point to their obligation to 
obtain some beneft for their community and their inability to stop the project.44 
Returning to our primary topic, an Indian Act band is not necessarily the 
proper rights-holder.45 Bands and band councils are creatures of statute. Band 
councils are (tautologically) the proper rights-holders of the rights granted to band 
councils in the Indian Act. As Christie notes in this issue, the powers delegated to 
bands in the Indian Act are limited to their reserves.46 Te vast majority of resource 
development projects occur outside reserve boundaries but within an Indigenous 
people’s traditional territory, as is the case with Coastal GasLink’s proposal to put 
a pipeline through Wet’suwet’en territory. Tese projects impact an Indigenous 
people’s inherent authority with respect to their traditional territory, as opposed to 
any rights created by the Indian Act. Similarly, we can imagine proposed activity 
on a reserve that impacts an Indigenous people’s inherent authority without 
afecting the limited rights created by the Indian Act. Tis inherent authority is 
what section 35(1) protects.47 Who is the proper rights-holder of these inherent 
rights? Te next part considers the existing jurisprudence, according to which 
the rights-holder is determined by the Indigenous peoples’ own laws. In some 
circumstances, the rights-holder can be coterminous with an Indian Act band, 
for example, as Metallic explains, if a band or other sub-group identifes and 
understands itself as a distinct people.48 More often, the rights-holder is a larger 
nation encompassing multiple bands. 
B. JURISPRUDENCE ON IDENTIFYING THE PROPER RIGHTS-HOLDER 
In his contribution to this special issue, Kent McNeil provides a comprehensive 
synthesis of the jurisprudence on the proper rights-holder in Aboriginal title, 
43. Ibid at 277, 279. 
44. Ibid at 278-79. 
45. Kwicksutaineuk/Ah-Kwa-Mish First Nation v Canada (AG), 2012 BCCA 193 at para 77; Kelly 
v Canada (AG), 2013 ONSC 1220 at para 58 [Kelly 2013], rev’d in part but af’d on this 
issue 2014 ONCA 92 [Kelly CA]. 
46. Christie, supra note 9 at 3. See also R v Lewis, [1996] 1 SCR 921 at para 80 (holding that 
“Parliament’s intention in enacting s. 81(1) as a whole [the provision detailing band councils’ 
governance powers] … was to provide a mechanism by which Band Councils could assume 
management over certain activities within the territorial limits of their constituencies”). 
47. Van der Peet, supra note 22 at para 40. 
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Aboriginal right, and duty to consult and accommodate cases involving First 
Nation claimants. He fnds that many SCC decisions to date have left the issue 
unaddressed. Aboriginal rights have been raised typically by individuals as defences 
to regulatory prosecutions, and so identifying the rights-holding collective has 
been unnecessary.49 And for the most part, the authority of claimants in duty to 
consult and accommodate cases decided by the SCC has not been questioned.50 
McNeil illustrates that Aboriginal title cases are more illuminating, and that the 
lower court decisions in Tsilhqot’in Nation in particular establish that courts are 
to resolve this issue by looking to Indigenous peoples’ own laws, culture, and 
traditions.51 In other words, who is the proper rights-holder according to the 
Indigenous people’s own laws? As McNeil notes, this is a question of fact which 
will depend on the evidence of the Indigenous people’s laws about their collective 
identity; thus, the answer can difer for diferent Indigenous peoples.52 
In Tsilhqot’in Nation, the lower courts held the larger Tsilhqot’in Nation— 
and not the smaller Indian Act bands within the Tsilhqot’in Nation—was the 
proper holder of the claimed Aboriginal rights and title.53 McNeil explains that 
the SCC’s declaration of Aboriginal title for the Tsilhqot’in Nation implicitly 
afrms this conclusion.54 In reaching his decision, the trial judge, Justice Vickers, 
applied the Powley factors—including shared customs, traditions, and collective 
identity—for identifying a historic rights-bearing community.55 Te evidence 
established that these factors existed at the level of the Tsilhqot’in people as a 
whole, and the rights of any Tsilhqot’in individual or sub-entity are derived from 
these nation-wide customs, or in other words, laws.56 For example, Tsilhqot’in 
laws provided that, although one of the Tsilhqot’in bands—the Xeni Gwet’in— 
was currently the caretaker of the claimed territory, any Tsilhqot’in person could 
hunt or fsh anywhere within Tsilhqot’in territory, including within the claimed 
territory.57 Tus, the band structure did not alter their true identity as Tsilhqot’in 
49. McNeil, supra note 16 at 168. 
50. Ibid. 
51. Ibid at 168-69. 
52. Ibid at 168, citing Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia, 2007 BCSC 1700 at para 439 
[Tsilhqot’in Nation BCSC]. See also Ogichidaakwe v Ontario (Energy), 2014 ONSC 
5492 at para 13. 
53. McNeil, supra note 16. 
54. Ibid. 
55. Tsilhqot’in Nation BCSC, supra note 52 at para 442, citing R v Powley, 2003 SCC 43 at 
para 23 [Powley]. 
56. See McNeil, supra note 16 at 168, citing Tsilhqot’in Nation BCSC, supra note 52 at para 470. 
57. McNeil, supra note 16 at 138, 168-69, citing Tsilhqot’in Nation BCSC, supra note 52 at 
paras 459, 468. 













people and “is without any meaning in the resolution of Aboriginal title and 
rights for Tsilhqot’in people.”58 
Te Powley factors might be interpreted as essentially cultural markers insofar 
as they do not require a political system or decision-making authority at the level 
of the rights-holder.59 Tus, the lack of an overarching pan-Tsilhqot’in governance 
structure was immaterial.60 Even though “Tsilhqot’in decision-making and 
governance traditionally took place on a localized level” within smaller family or 
encampment groupings, the Court of Appeal afrmed Justice Vickers’s conclusion 
that the rights-holder is the larger Tsilhqot’in Nation.61 Both courts rejected 
British Columbia’s attempt to impose a governance structure requirement. 
British Columbia argued that to be a proper rights-holder, an entity must have 
traditionally exercised decision-making authority about the allocation of the rights 
at issue, and thus the lack of any traditional pan-Tsilhqot’in governance structure 
should be fatal to the claim that the Tsilhqot’in nation was the rights-holder.62 
We can critically examine the assumptions underlying this argument. 
As noted above, the Tsilhqot’in nation did in fact have customs at the 
national level about who could exercise hunting and fshing rights within 
Tsilhqot’in territory. And yet, British Columbia seemed to urge the courts to 
disregard the signifcance of these customs, merely because they did not emanate 
from a “pan-Tsilhqot’in governance structure.” If these customs were not the 
product of an overarching governance structure, where did they come from? One 
possibility is that they are customary laws,63 which do not depend on a centralized 
authority for either their existence or their enforcement. Instead, customary laws 
are refected in the practices which are widely accepted within a community as 
having normative force, which in turn rests on persuasive compliance.64 Te 
58. McNeil, supra note 16 at 138, citing Tsilhqot’in Nation BCSC, supra note 52 at para 469. 
59. Powley, supra note 55 at para 23, cited by Tsilhqot’in Nation BCSC, supra note 52 at para 
442 (recognizing “that diferent groups of Métis have often lacked political structures” and 
afrming that a collective identity that exhibits “some degree of continuity and stability” is 
sufcient for establishing a rights-bearing community). 
60. Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia, 2012 BCCA 285 at paras 145-46 
[Tsilhqot’in Nation CA]. 
61. Ibid at para 146. 
62. Ibid at para 145. 
63. I make this suggestion merely as a hypothetical and not as a description of actual Tsilhqot’in 
laws. I do not have the expertise to analyze Tsilhqot’in laws and I am not making a claim 
about Tsilhqot’in laws. 
64. See John Borrows, Canada’s Indigenous Constitution (University of Toronto Press, 2010) at 
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traditional governance systems of many Indigenous peoples—though not all65— 
are grounded in customary laws.66 
In contrast, the Canadian legal system is commonly thought to instantiate 
legal positivism,67 which holds that all law is derived from, and enforced by, 
institutions specifcally authorized to perform those tasks. According to legal 
positivism, customary laws are not laws. Instead, they are some lesser aspect of 
culture such as ethics, morals, or etiquette because they are neither produced nor 
enforced by institutions specifcally authorized for those purposes.68 With this 
explanation in mind, British Columbia’s argument in Tsilhqot’in Nation is revealed 
as being steeped within positivism. It assigns no signifcance to customary laws 
merely because they were not produced by the particular type of decision-making 
structure endorsed by legal positivism. Justice Vickers rejects British Columbia’s 
approach because it “is weighed down with superfcial value judgments,” insofar 
as using the norms of one society to assess the norms of another assumes the 
former is “civilized” while the latter is “without cohesion, laws or culture, in efect 
a subhuman species.”69 Likewise, the Court of Appeal rejected a positivist 
governance structure requirement because of the impossibility of tracing the 
smaller sub-entities to modern counterparts given the fuidity of the Tsilhqot’in 
political structure.70 If a static, positivist governance structure requirement is 
imposed, then “no one would be able to claim Aboriginal rights on behalf of the 
65. See Borrows, Indigenous Constitution, supra note 64 at ch 2, especially at 51-55 (explaining 
that Indigenous peoples are often characterized as possessing only customary law, but in 
fact their legal systems also encompass positivistic law, as well as sacred law, natural law, and 
deliberative law). 
66. I use the phrase “customary law” given its prevalence within the literature, especially 
within discussions of the dichotomy between legal positivism and customary law. But 
Aaron Mills argues compellingly that Indigenous “law” is better conceptualized in terms of 
constitutionalism. See generally Mills, supra note 33. 
67. For a naturalist analysis of the liberal positivism informing Canadian law regarding 
Aboriginal rights, see Gordon Christie, Canadian Law and Indigenous Self-Determination: 
A Naturalist Analysis (University of Toronto Press, 2019) at ch 6. 
68. See Borrows, Indigenous Constitution, supra note 64 at 12, citing John Austin, Te Province of 
Jurisprudence Determined (Cambridge University Press, 1995) at 176; Hamar Foster, “One 
Good Ting: Law, Elevator Etiquette and Litigating Aboriginal Rights in Canada” (2010) 37 
Adv Q 66 (recounting the suggestion made by counsel for Canada in the Tsilhqot’in case that 
Tsilhqot’in “rules were more like elevator etiquette than law” at 80-81). 
69. Tsilhqot’in Nation BCSC, supra note 52 at para 453, citing Calder v British Columbia 
(AG), [1973] SCR 313 at 346, Hall J, dissenting (but not on this point) [Calder]; see also 
Tsilhqot’in Nation CA, supra note 60 at paras 145-46. 
70. Tsilhqot’in Nation CA, supra note 60 at para 146. 
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Tsilhqot’in.”71 A right without a rights-holder is hollow.72 In other words, using 
the conventions of one legal system (e.g., legal positivism) to evaluate a society that 
instantiates a diferent legal system (e.g., customary law), results in constitutional 
capture. For these reasons, the test for identifying a section 35 rights-holder does 
not require a positivist decision-making or governance structure at the level of 
the rights-holder. 
Although the rights-holder can take diferent forms for diferent Indigenous 
peoples, in most cases, the rights-holder is a larger nation encompassing multiple 
bands as opposed to a single Indian Act band.73 Tis is hardly surprising given 
that the band structure is viewed by many Indigenous peoples as an artifcial 
imposition which does not correlate with their own laws and political system.74 
McNeil does identify a lower court decision where the proper rights-holders are 
the bands: Ahousaht Indian Band v Canada (Attorney General).75 As McNeil notes, 
this conclusion in this case is not inconsistent with the trial judge’s conclusion in 
Tsilhqot’in Nation because both are supported by the evidence of the respective 
Indigenous peoples’ laws about their collective identity.76 Te Indigenous 
claimants in Ahousaht Indian Band asserted that their fve Indian Act bands were 
the rights-holders, and argued only in the alternative that the fve bands formed 
a single Nuu-chah-nulth Nation, although they did not press the latter argument 
in fnal submissions.77 Canada did not argue that either the larger nation or the 
bands were the rights-holders; it merely argued the fve bands failed to satisfy the 
community continuity requirement,78 discussed in Part IV, below. Te trial judge 
agreed with the Aboriginal claimants that the fve bands were the rights-holders.79 
Te evidence established that each of the fve claimants self-identifed as an 
autonomous nation, despite sharing a common Nuu-chah-nulth language, 
71. Ibid at para 146. 
72. Karen Drake, “Who Are the Métis? Te Role of Free, Prior and Informed Consent in 
Identifying a Métis Rights-Holder” in Dwight Newman & Ibironke Odumosu-Ayanu, 
eds, Indigenous–Industry Agreements, Natural Resources, and the Law (Routledge, 2020) 
[Drake, “Who are the Métis?”]. 
73. Tsilhqot’in Nation BCSC, supra note 52 at para 445. See also Metallic, supra note 13 at 253. 
For a list of decisions in which the nation—as opposed to a smaller sub-entity—is assumed 
or held to be the rights-holder, see R v Bernard, 2017 NBCA 48 at para 51 [Bernard CA]. 
74. Borrows, “Wise Practices,” supra note 6 at 10. 
75. McNeil, supra note 16 at 169-70, citing Ahousaht Indian Band v Canada (AG), 2009 BCSC 
1494 [Ahousaht Indian Band], rev’d in part on other grounds 2013 BCCA 300. 
76. McNeil, supra note 16 at 169-70. See also Ahousaht Indian Band, supra note 75 at para 8. 
77. Ahousaht Indian Band, supra note 75 at paras 1, 7-8. 
78. Ibid at para 300. 
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culture, and history.80 Tis case illustrates the importance of not imposing a 
pan-Indigenous approach; diferent Indigenous peoples organize themselves 
politically in diferent ways. 
Tus, Ahousaht Indian Band afrms the principle established in Tsilhqot’in 
Nation that the rights-holder is determined by the Indigenous peoples’ own laws. 
In some circumstances, those laws establish the rights-holder is coterminous with 
an Indian Act band; in others, the rights-holder is a larger nation encompassing 
multiple bands. 
C. IDENTIFYING THE RIGHTS-HOLDER BASED ON THE PLAIN MEANING 
OF THE TEXT 
None of the courts in Powley, Tsilhqot’in Nation, or Ahousaht Indian Band 
analyzed the rights-holder issue in the light of the text of section 35. Tis is 
puzzling, given the SCC’s preoccupation with the text of treaties while claiming 
to recognize the signifcance of treaties’ oral terms.81 Presumably, when the 
Court explicitly addresses the rights-holder issue, its analysis will begin with a 
consideration of the words of section 35. As is well known, section 35 must 
be given a purposive interpretation,82 which is discussed below. But a purposive 
interpretation is not an invitation to dispense with the text of a constitutional 
provision.83 Constitutional interpretation begins with the language of the 
constitutional provision in question; this principle is not displaced by any other 
principle of constitutional interpretation.84 
Te text of both sub-sections 35(1) and 35(2) describes the rights-holders as 
the “[A]boriginal peoples of Canada.”85 As Chartrand notes, the term “peoples” 
is commonly understood to be synonymous with “nations.”86 Yet as Metallic 
recognizes, courts—including the Supreme Court of Canada—do not confne 
themselves to the terms “peoples” or “nations” when referring to Aboriginal 
80. Ibid at para 299. 
81. See e.g. R v Badger, [1996] 1 SCR 771 at paras 39, 52, 55, 57, 101 (afrming the importance 
of the oral terms of a treaty but not giving efect to those oral terms in the actual holding 
of the decision). 
82. Van der Peet, supra note 22 at paras 21-22, 26-31. 
83. See Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 SCR 217 at para 53 [Succession Reference]; Caron 
v Alberta, 2015 SCC 56 at para 36 [Caron]. 
84. Caron, supra note 83 at para 37; British Columbia (AG) v Canada (AG), [1994] 
2 SCR 41 at 88. 
85. Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 1 [emphasis added]. 
86. Chartrand, supra note 17 at 178. See also Larry Chartrand, “Te Constitutional 
Determination of a Métis Rights-Bearing Community: Reorienting the Powley Test” in Karen 
& Brenda, supra note 23, 169 at 171 [Chartrand, “Métis Rights-Bearing Community”]. 
















peoples.87 In fact, the Court often defaults to the terms “communities” 
or “groups,” among others, instead of “peoples.”88 Te Court never explains or 
defends this equivocation, which seems unwarranted given the diferences in 
meaning between “peoples” on the one hand, and “communities” or “groups” 
on the other.89 Christie’s article in this issue provides a valuable framework for 
understanding the signifcance of these diferences. He illustrates how the various 
propositions and requirements within the Court’s jurisprudence on site-specifc 
Aboriginal rights result in (1) a conception of Aboriginal peoples as socio-cultural 
bodies as opposed to political bodies, and (2) a conception of Aboriginal rights 
as cultural activities as opposed to governmental powers to exercise jurisdictional 
authority or, in other words, engage in law-making.90 Te Court’s deeper 
rationale underlying these choices goes unstated throughout its jurisprudence, 
but Christie demonstrates how the philosophical tenets of liberalism provide a 
comprehensive explanation. A key premise of liberalism is that each individual 
is entitled to structure and live their life in accordance with their own values and 
norms.91 For some individuals in a multicultural context, their preferred values 
and norms can only be fully accessed through the group or community—such 
as a religious community, for example—which serves as the cultural repository 
of those values and norms.92 Within liberalism, these groups or communities are 
socio-cultural bodies, not political bodies; as Christie explains, “the liberal state 
is presumed to be the sole source of political and legal authority.”93 Within the 
Court’s jurisprudence, Aboriginal peoples are akin to these socio-cultural bodies 
and Aboriginal rights are akin to the rights of members of the equity-seeking 
groups who make up the socio-cultural bodies. Te Court’s commitment to 
liberalism leaves no conceptual space for an understanding of Aboriginal peoples 
87. Metallic, supra note 13 at 250-51. 
88. For a list of such decisions, see Bernard CA, supra note 73 at para 51. See also Chartrand, 
“Métis Rights-Bearing Community,” supra note 86 at 171. 
89. Te most pronounced instance of this equivocation occurs at para 12 of Powley, where the 
Court moves from a discussion of Métis “peoples” or “people” to a discussion of a Métis 
“community” with no justifcation for introducing the term “community,” which appears 
nowhere in the text of section 35. See Powley, supra note 55 at para 12. For critiques of this 
equivocation, see Karen Drake, “Who are the Métis?,” supra note 72 at 8; Chartrand, “Métis 
Rights-Bearing Community,” supra note 86 at 171-72. 
90. Christie, supra note 9 at 9, 14-19. 
91. Ibid at 29. 
92. Ibid at 30. See also Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Teory of Minority 
Rights (Clarendon Press, 1995) at ch 5. 
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as political entities,94 nor for an Aboriginal right to exercise legal or political 
authority.95 Te Court’s analysis is captured by liberalism. 
Te SCC’s shift from “peoples” to “groups” and “communities” coheres 
seamlessly with this vision of Aboriginal rights as captured within liberalism. Te 
term “peoples” is commonly understood to denote political entities as opposed 
to mere socio-cultural entities, given the various international law instruments 
afrming that peoples have the right of self-determination.96 In contrast, the 
terms “group” and “community” typically describe equity-seeking groups who 
claim state protection for their cultural choices but make no claim to be entitled 
to exercise governmental powers such as jurisdiction and law-making authority. 
Te problem is the complete lack of textual basis for replacing “peoples” with 
“groups” or “communities.” Although principles of constitutional interpretation 
provide for a large and liberal interpretation, these principles “do not undermine 
the primacy of the written text of the Constitution.”97 As the SCC has recognized, 
the Constitution is not “an empty vessel to be flled with whatever meaning” 
the Court might choose.98 Te Constitutional text states the rights-holders are 
“peoples”; the jurisprudence should respect this text. 
D. A PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 35 
As mentioned, section 35 must be given a purposive interpretation, which 
requires identifying the rationale underlying section 35 and then interpreting 
it in a way that gives efect to that rationale.99 Te overarching purpose of 
section 35 is reconciliation,100 but identifying the exact two things that require 
94. Shin Imai & Kathryn Gunn, “Indigenous Belonging: Membership and Identity in the 
UNDRIP: Articles 9, 33, 35, and 36” in Jessie Hohmann & Marc Weller, eds, Te 
UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: A Commentary (Oxford University 
Press, 2018) 213 at 234 (explaining that the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples 
identifes Indigenous peoples as “political units, not ethnic enclaves”) [Imai & Gunn, 
“Indigenous Belonging”]. 
95. Christie, supra note 9 at 31. 
96. Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, Can TS 1945 No 7, art 1(2) (entered into 
force 24 October 1945); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
16 December 1966, 993 UNTS 3, art 1 (entered into force 3 January 1976); International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 19 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171, art 1 (entered 
into force 23 March 1976); United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 
GA Res 61/295, UNGAOR, 61st Sess, UN Doc A/RES/61/295 (2 October 2007, adopted 
13 September 2007) arts 1, 3 [UN Declaration]. 
97. Caron, supra note 83 at para 36; Secession Reference, supra note 83 at para 53. 
98. Caron, supra note 83 at para 36; Reference re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta), 
[1987] 1 SCR 313 at 394. 
99. Van der Peet, supra note 22 at paras 21-22. 
100. Van der Peet, supra note 22 at para 31. 
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reconciling is far from straightforward. Aimée Craft provides a table summarizing 
the SCC’s many statements on this topic.101 On one side of the reconciliation 
ledger, we have something related to Aboriginal peoples; this has been variously 
described by the Court as Aboriginal “peoples,” “cultures,” “rights,” “societies,” 
or “prior occupation,” among others.102 On the other side, we have something 
related to Canada; this has been variously described by the Court as “the assertion 
of Crown sovereignty,” “Canadian sovereignty,” “non-Aboriginal peoples,” “the 
arrival of Europeans,”103 or “de facto control of land and resources that were 
formerly in the control of [an Aboriginal] people,”104 among others. Te wide 
variety among these descriptors could be used to support diferent articulations of 
the purpose of section 35 and hence diferent interpretations of “peoples.”105 For 
example, if one accepts that the purpose of section 35 is to reconcile Aboriginal 
cultures on the one hand, with Canadian sovereignty on the other, then one would 
be motivated to characterize Aboriginal peoples as mere socio-cultural groups or 
communities asserting cultural rights within a sovereign state, the legitimacy of 
which is unquestioned. Te justifcation for these cultural rights comes from 
liberalism, in accordance with Christie’s analysis. 
In contrast, if the purpose of section 35 is to reconcile Aboriginal peoples
with Canada’s de facto control of Aboriginal peoples’ lands, then Aboriginal 
peoples can be understood as peoples or political entities who are entitled to 
exercise governmental and law-making authority. Te state’s sovereignty is 
de facto and not de jure,106 and thus the rationale underlying Indigenous 
governmental authority is not liberalism but rather the right of self-determination, 
or in other words, Indigenous peoples’ own inherent authority. In this way, the 
indeterminacy of the current reconciliation jurisprudence supports multiple 
purposive interpretations of the section 35 rights-holder. To decide between 
these interpretations, we must evaluate the assumptions informing them. Is the 
101. Craft, supra note 23 at 73. 
102. Ibid. 
103. Ibid. 
104. Haida Nation v British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2004 SCC 73 at para 32. 
105. Chief Justice Lamer seems to touch on this point in Van der Peet. Shortly after afrming that 
a purposive interpretation of section 35(1) will facilitate reconciliation, he acknowledges 
that “the notion of ‘reconciliation’ does not, in the abstract, mandate a particular content for 
aboriginal rights.” See Van der Peet, supra note 22 at para 50. 
106. For an analysis of Canada’s sovereignty as de facto and not de jure, see Ryan Beaton, “De 
facto and de jure Crown Sovereignty: Reconciliation and Legitimation at the Supreme 
Court of Canada” (2018) 27 Const Forum Const 25; Felix Hoehn, Reconciling Sovereignties: 
Aboriginal Nations and Canada (Native Law Center, University of Saskatchewan, 2012) at 
34-35; Brian Slattery, “Aboriginal Rights and the Honour of the Crown” (2005) 29 SCLR 
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Canadian state’s claim of sovereignty over Indigenous peoples and Indigenous 
territories legitimate (supporting the former interpretation) or illegitimate 
(supporting the latter interpretation)? A multitude of reports and legal and 
scholarly analyses demonstrate the illegitimacy of Canada’s claim of sovereignty 
vis-à-vis Indigenous peoples.107 Moreover, the latter interpretation coheres with 
the plain meaning of the text which, as discussed above, states that section 35 
rights-holders are “peoples.” Te former interpretation, in contrast, directly 
contradicts the plain meaning of the text. Tus, the most coherent purposive 
interpretation provides that the purpose of section 35 is to reconcile Aboriginal 
peoples with Canada’s de facto control of Aboriginal peoples’ lands, and thus that 
section 35 rights-holders are peoples. 
III. IDENTIFYING THE RIGHTS-HOLDER IN R V BERNARD
Te issue of identifying the rights-holder recently arose in R v Bernard. In this case, 
Naiomi Metallic served as counsel at the Court of Appeal for Stephen Bernard, 
a Mìgmaw member of the Sipekne’katik First Nation.108 Her contribution to 
this special issue provides an incisive critical analysis of the courts’ decisions in 
this case. Mr. Bernard was charged with hunting in the northern part of the 
City of Saint John, New Brunswick, without a licence, contrary to provincial 
legislation.109 He argued he had a section 35(1) Aboriginal right to do so.110 Te 
courts rejected Mr. Bernard’s section 35(1) claim for two interrelated reasons. 
First, the courts held the smaller “communities,” rather than the larger Mìgmaq 
nation, were the Aboriginal rights-holders.111 Te territory in New Brunswick 
where Mr. Bernard was hunting was part of the territory of the Mìgmaq nation, 
but not of Mr. Bernard’s specifc band, whose reserve is located in Nova Scotia.112 
107. TRC Final Report, supra note 23 at 29; Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples: 
Looking Forward, Looking Back, vol 1 (Supply and Services Canada, 1996) at 661; Larry 
Chartrand, “Indigenous Peoples: Caught in a Perpetual Human Rights Prison” (2016) 67 
UNBLJ 167 at 169; Michael Asch, On Being Here to Stay: Treaties and Aboriginal Rights in 
Canada (University of Toronto Press, 2014) at 11; Hoehn, supra note 106; Robert J Miller 
et al, Discovering Indigenous Lands: Te Doctrine of Discovery in the English Colonies (Oxford 
University Press, 2010); John Borrows, “Sovereignty’s Alchemy: An Analysis of Delgamuukw 
v. British Columbia” (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall LJ 537; Michael Asch & Patrick Macklem, 
“Aboriginal Rights and Canadian Sovereignty: An Essay on R. v. Sparrow” (1991) 29 
Alta L Rev 498. 
108. Metallic, supra note 13 at 233. 
109. Bernard CA, supra note 73 at para 9. 
110. Ibid at para 36. 
111. Ibid at paras 45, 50, 62. 
112. Ibid at paras 4-5, 19, 41. 

















Second, the courts introduced what I refer to as the community-occupation-
continuity requirement. Te courts held that Mr. Bernard failed to satisfy this 
requirement because the Mìgmaq sub-entity who traditionally occupied the 
territory where Mr. Bernard was hunting had left the area “a long time ago” and 
there was “no evidence of a contemporary community of Mi’kmaq in the area.”113 
Part III(A), below, critically examines the courts’ frst reason for rejecting Mr. 
Bernard’s claim. Part III(B) examines the second reason. 
A. IS THE RIGHTS-HOLDER THE SMALLER OR THE LARGER ENTITY? 
As Metallic explains, the courts accepted the Crown’s argument that the larger 
Mìgmaq nation could not be the proper rights-holder because it lacked an 
overarching decision-making authority, given its historically decentralized 
nature.114 Tis position is encapsulated most pointedly in the Crown’s repeated 
statement in oral submissions that the Mìgmaq nation “lacked a Super Chief.”115 
Te courts based this conclusion on the evidence of the Crown’s expert witness 
who testifed that smaller collectives of Mìgmaq—rather than the Mìgmaq nation 
as a whole—signed the seventeenth-century Peace and Friendship Treaties.116 Te 
Court of Appeal of New Brunswick acknowledged the common cultural and 
social bonds among the Mìgmaq nation as a whole, as well as the fact that the 
smaller sub-entities historically came together to form a Grand Council.117 Tis 
Grand Council, though, lacked a “grand chief,” and thus the Crown’s expert 
concluded that it was “a cultural entity, not one of polity.”118 Te separate hunting 
territories of each of the sub-entities also infuenced the courts’ conclusion.119 
Finally, the Court of Appeal of New Brunswick relied on a passage in Van der Peet
where the Court repeatedly used the terms “groups” and “communities” to refer 
to the rights-holders, as well as to a passage in Delgamuukw where the SCC 
described Aboriginal rights as “communal.”120 
Taking the last premise frst, Metallic highlights the circularity of concluding 
that only the smaller communities—and not the larger community—can be the 
rights-holder merely because Aboriginal rights are “communal.”121 Moreover, 
113. Ibid at para 60. 
114. Metallic, supra note 13 at 234. See also Bernard CA, supra note 73 at paras 56-57. 
115. Metallic, supra note 13 at 235. 
116. Ibid. See also Bernard CA, supra note 73 at paras 53, 57. 
117. Ibid at paras 56-57. 
118. Bernard CA, supra note 73 at para 57, citing R v Bernard, 2010 NBPC 30 at 124 [emphasis 
added] [Bernard PC]. See also ibid at para 120. 
119. Bernard CA, supra note 73 at paras 56-57. 
120. Metallic, supra note 13 at 257-59, citing Bernard CA at paras 47, 52. 
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the analysis in Part II(C-D), above, provides a full answer to the SCC’s use 
of the terms “groups” and “communities” in Van der Peet. Given the Court’s 
lack of textual analysis of section 35 as required by principles of constitutional 
interpretation, and given the Court’s lack of justifcation for ignoring the term 
“peoples” in section 35 and adopting the terms “groups” and “communities” 
instead, the Court’s use of those terms cannot be considered part of the ratio in 
Van der Peet, and thus is not determinative of rights-holders’ identities. 
Moreover, the courts in Bernard succumbed to constitutional capture by 
using positivism as the criteria by which to identify the rights-holder. Te courts 
assumed an overarching decision-making authority or Super Chief must exist at 
the level of the rights-holder but cite no authority in support of this positivist 
requirement.122 Tis approach was explicitly rejected by the two lower courts in 
Tsilhqot’in Nation, and that rejection was implicitly afrmed by the SCC when 
it accepted that Aboriginal title is held by the Tsilhqot’in Nation as a whole.123 
In contrast, if we consider the Mìgmaq Nation through the lens of its own 
constitutionalism, we can avoid constitutional capture. Metallic explains that 
Mìgmaq governance operates through a multi-level, federal structure; district 
chiefs come together at the level of the Mìgmawei Grand Council (Mawiomi), 
which is a political body.124 Te existence of separate hunting territories within 
other levels of this federal structure in no way detracts from the political nature 
of the Mawiomi. Te salient facts are that governance occurs at the level 
of the Mìgmaq Nation through the Mawiomi, and that the Mìgmaq Nation 
understands itself to be the rights-holder. Simply because the local levels within 
the Mìgmaq Nation’s federal structure more closely resemble the conventions 
of legal positivism or western exercises of jurisdiction, they cannot trump the 
Mawiomi as the representative of the rights-holder. If they did, we would have a 
prime example of constitutional capture. 
What we need is a means of identifying the rights-holder that does not 
succumb to constitutional capture, including capture by liberalism or positivism. 
At frst glance, the solution might appear to be to impose a requirement that 
the rights-holder must have a political structure which conforms to Indigenous 
constitutionalism. But Indigenous peoples are not a homogenous monolith. 
122. Te Court of Appeal relied on a statement from R v Marshall; R v Bernard about the 
exclusive occupation requirement within the test for Aboriginal title. See R v Marshall; 
R v Bernard, 2005 SCC 43 at para 62 [Marshall; Bernard]; Bernard CA, supra note 73 at para 
50. Metallic rightly explains that in so doing, the Court of Appeal unjustifably confates the 
Aboriginal title test with the Aboriginal rights test. See Metallic, supra note 13 at 258. 
123. See text accompanying notes 55 to 59. 
124. Metallic, supra note 13 at 234, 253-55. 
















No one form of political structure will resonate within the constitutionalism of 
each Indigenous people. 
Te logical conclusion is to use each Indigenous people’s own standard for 
identifying their rights-holder. Tis means not formulating an a priori standard 
of what constitutes a rights-holder and then measuring Indigenous peoples 
against it. Rather, it means deferring to each particular Aboriginal people about 
who their rights-holder is. In this way, we can identify a political entity without 
succumbing to constitutional capture, including pan-Indigenous constitutional 
capture. Tis approach is already well-supported by the jurisprudence. Te Court 
of Appeal in Tsilhqot’in Nation afrmed the trial judge’s conclusion that “the 
defnition of the proper rights holder is a matter to be determined primarily from 
the viewpoint of the Aboriginal collective itself.”125 I noted above that the Powley
factors might be characterized as cultural markers.126 But we can now see that 
assumption itself is captured by positivism. A more accurate statement is that 
while the Powley factors do not require a positivist governmental structure, they 
direct courts to identify the political entity which constitutes the rights-holder 
according to the Indigenous people’s own laws. Te Powley factors include 
shared customs, traditions, and collective identity. In other words, courts should 
look to a people’s laws (shared customs, traditions) in whatever form they take, 
including customary law, to determine who the rights-holder is according to 
their law (their collective identity). Te value of the Powley factors is they avoid 
constitutional capture. 
Tis principle—that the identity of the rights-holder is to be decided by 
an Aboriginal people themselves—is a common theme throughout the articles 
in this special issue.127 It is also consistent with the right of self-determination, 
which as Christie notes is a right of peoples at international law,128 and which is 
afrmed by the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.129 
Article 33 in particular afrms not only Indigenous peoples’ right to determine 
their own membership but also the right to determine their own identity.130 Shin 
125. Tsilhqot’in Nation CA, supra note 60 at para 149; Kelly 2013, supra note 45 at para 59. 
126. See text accompanying note 59. 
127. Metallic, supra note 13 at 236-37, 18; McNeil, supra note 16 at 128, 32; Christie, 
supra note 9 at 6. 
128. Christie, supra note 9 at 26. 
129. UN Declaration, supra note 96, arts 1, 3. 
130. Ibid, art 33. Article 33 of the UN Declaration states: 
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to determine their own identity or membership in 
accordance with their customs and traditions. Tis does not impair the right of indigenous 
individuals to obtain citizenship of the States in which they live. 
2. Indigenous peoples have the right to determine the structures and to select the membership 
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Imai and Kathryn Gunn explain this “right to determine identity makes it clear 
that Indigenous people decide what to call themselves and how they identify the 
constituent groupings that make up the people as a whole.”131 
To summarize, the reasoning in the Bernard decisions is circular, ignores the 
plain meaning of the text of section 35, and succumbs to constitutional capture. 
In contrast, the approach adopted by the lower courts in Tsilhqot’in Nation, and 
apparently approved by the SCC—including application of the Powley factors— 
provides a roadmap for avoiding constitutional capture. 
B. MUST A SECTION 35 RIGHTS-HOLDER SATISFY A COMMUNITY-
OCCUPATION-CONTINUITY REQUIREMENT? 
Tis section examines the courts’ second reason for rejecting Mr. Bernard’s 
section 35 claim. As Metallic explains, the trial judge introduced a new 
community-occupation-continuity requirement, according to which the 
contemporary rights-holding Aboriginal people must maintain a presence in the 
area where the right was historically exercised.132 Te Court of Appeal of New 
Brunswick in Bernard seems to afrm this requirement when it emphasizes the 
trial judge’s fnding that prior to contact, a Mìgmaq “community” hunted in the 
area where Mr. Bernard hunted, but this “community” left the area some time 
ago and there was no evidence of a contemporary Mìgmaq “community” in the 
area.133 Resolving this issue is important because British Columbia is raising it in 
Desautel, which will be heard by the SCC.134 British Columbia relies on the Court 
of Appeal of New Brunswick’s decision in Bernard, arguing that Mr. Desautel 
cannot establish an Aboriginal right to hunt in British Columbia because the 
Lakes Tribe of the Colville Confederated Tribes—of which Mr. Desautel is a 
member—is now located not in British Columbia but in Washington state.135 
131. Imai & Gunn, “Indigenous Belonging,” supra note 94 at 231. 
132. Bernard PC, supra note 118 at paras 109, 127, 137; Metallic, supra note 13 at 234. Metallic 
uses the term “community-continuity requirement” or “CCR” to refer to the Crown’s 
proposed requirement. I use the term “community-occupation-continuity requirement” to 
highlight how it difers from the community continuity requirement discussed in Powley, 
but Metallic and I are both referring to the same thing, namely, the Crown’s proposed 
requirement, which is much thicker than the actual doctrinal law established in Van der Peet
and Powley, as discussed in this section. 
133. Bernard CA, supra note 73 at para 60. See also Bernard PC, supra note 118 at paras 101, 
126. I place the term “community” in quotation marks to indicate that although the Court 
of Appeal uses this term, it is not the correct term in this context given that “peoples”—the 
term employed within section 35—is not synonymous with “communities.” 
134. Desautel Leave to SCC Granted, supra note 28. 
135. See Desautel CA, supra note 28 at paras 40, 58; R v Desautel, SCC File No 38734, 29 January 
2020 (Factum of the Appellant, Her Majesty the Queen at para 62). 



















Metallic’s thorough critique of the courts’ analysis in Bernard resonates with 
many of the British Columbia Court of Appeal’s conclusions in Desautel. For 
example, Metallic shows that a community-occupation-continuity requirement 
assumes the Mìgmaq lived in static, fxed, sedentary village sites; thus, the 
requirement ignores the reality of Mìgmaq social organization, including 
sub-entities which were traditionally mobile and fssionable.136 Similarly, the Court 
of Appeal in Desautel held that a community-occupation-continuity requirement 
ignores the Aboriginal perspective, contrary to the SCC’s jurisprudence.137 
Moreover, both Metallic and the Court of Appeal in Desautel explain that a 
community-occupation-continuity requirement is not part of the current law.138 
It is not a component of the Van der Peet test for identifying Aboriginal rights,139 
nor is it introduced by the Powley decision.140 Te community continuity 
requirement explained in Powley is much thinner than the Crown’s proposed 
community-occupation-continuity requirement. Powley only requires that the 
rights-holder continue to exist; it does not require that the rights-holder live or 
otherwise have some presence where the rights-holder historically lived or where 
the right is exercised.141 Te thin requirement follows tautologically from the 
principle that the collective is the rights-holder.142 Since the rights-holder is the 
collective, the collective who holds the right must currently exist. Te issue was 
raised in Powley only because the existence of a contemporary Métis rights-holder 
was contested. Te Court described the contemporary Métis rights-holder as 
having gone “underground” for a period of time and acknowledged their “lack 
of visibility,” but afrmed their continued existence.143 As Metallic explains, the 
issue has not arisen and should not arise for First Nations—such as the Mìgmaq 
Nation—who have not gone “underground” and who obviously continue 
to exist.144 When the SCC in Powley discusses the continued existence of the 
Métis rights-holder, it describes the Métis as being located “in and around Sault 
Ste. Marie.”145 Nowhere in Powley does the Court make the location of the 
rights-holder a requirement within the Aboriginal rights test. Te area in and 
136. Metallic, supra note 13 at 245. 
137. Desautel CA, supra note 28 at para 62; Van der Peet, supra note 22 at paras 49-50. 
138. Metallic, supra note 13 at 248; Desautel CA, supra note 28 at para 61. 
139. Ibid. 
140. Ibid at paras 58-59. 
141. Powley, supra note 55 at paras 24-28; Desautel CA, supra note 28 at para 61. 
142. See text accompanying note 4. 
143. Powley, supra note 55 at para 27. 
144. Metallic, supra note 13 at 251. 
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around Sault Ste. Marie just happened to be where Steve and Rod Powley lived 
and so their location is described as such. In fact, as Jason Madden explains, the 
Métis rights-holder in Powley is explicitly not defned as being limited to the area 
“in and around Sault Ste. Marie.”146 Rather, the trial judge rejected the Crown’s 
attempt to impose such a narrow defnition.147 Instead, the trial judge held the 
geographical scope of the Métis rights-holder “extended hundreds of kilometres 
to the east, north and west of Sault Ste. Marie, spanning almost 20,000 square 
kilometres on the Canadian side” and going into northern Michigan.148 Te SCC 
upheld these fndings.149 
Metallic further critiques the community-occupation-continuity requirement 
on the ground that it confates the Aboriginal rights test with the Aboriginal title 
test,150 which does require the rights-holder to establish continuity of occupation, 
at least in certain circumstances.151 Tis latter qualifcation should be emphasized: 
Even within the Aboriginal title test, proving continuity of occupation is not a 
standalone requirement. As explained in Delgamuukw and afrmed in Tsilhqot’in 
Nation, continuity of occupation must be proved only when present occupation 
is relied on as proof of pre-sovereignty occupation.152 As long as the Aboriginal 
claimant has direct evidence of their pre-sovereignty occupation and does not 
rely on present occupation, there is no need to prove continuity.153 Imposing 
continuity of occupation as a standalone requirement could result in the implicit 
extinguishment of Aboriginal title, due to either abandonment or executive acts 
dispossessing Aboriginal peoples of their land.154 But as Kent McNeil explains, 
such implicit extinguishment is contrary to principles of both the common law 
and section 35.155 As discussed, Aboriginal rights, including title, are collective 
or communal rights, “and it appears that communal rights cannot be waived 
146. Madden, supra note 20 at 206. 
147. Ibid. 
148. Ibid, citing R v Powley, [1998] OJ No 5310 (Ont Ct J) at paras 68, 70. 
149. Ibid, citing Powley, supra note 55 at paras 21, 26, 28. 
150. Metallic, supra note 13 at 248. 
151. Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia, 2014 SCC 44 at paras 45-46 [Tsilhqot’in Nation SCC]. 
152. Delgamuukw, supra note 4 at para 152; Tsilhqot’in Nation SCC at paras 45-46. 
153. See Kent McNeil, “Continuity of Aboriginal Rights” in Kerry Wilkins, ed, Advancing 
Aboriginal Claims: Visions/Strategies/Directions (Purich Publishing Ltd, 2004) 127 at 135-36, 
138 [McNeil, “Continuity”]; Karen Drake & Adam Gaudry, “‘Te lands … belonged to 
them, once by the Indian title, twice for having defended them … and thrice for having built 
and lived on them’: Te Law and Politics of Métis Title” (2016) 54 Osgoode Hall LJ 1 at 30 
[Drake & Gaudry, “Métis Title”]. See also Delgamuukw, supra note 4 at para 152. 
154. Drake & Gaudry, “Métis Title,” supra note 153 at 30. 
155. McNeil, “Continuity,” supra note 153 at 137-38. 











or abandoned, particularly where the interests of future generations would be 
jeopardized.”156 Moreover, as a legal right, Aboriginal title cannot be extinguished 
by mere executive acts; Aboriginal title can only be extinguished by competent 
legislation prior to 17 April 1982.157 As noted by both Metallic and the Court 
of Appeal in Desautel, a community-occupation-continuity requirement within 
the Aboriginal rights test would also allow for implicit extinguishment,158 which 
would be just as contrary to the legal principles just discussed. 
To summarize, the community-occupation-continuity requirement is not 
grounded in the Aboriginal rights jurisprudence and thus should not be adopted 
in subsequent decisions. 
IV. POTENTIAL CHALLENGES IN APPLYING INDIGENOUS 
LAW TO IDENTIFY THE RIGHTS-HOLDER 
Tis section discusses some potential challenges of using an Indigenous people’s 
laws to identify the rights-holder. A lack of consensus within an Indigenous people 
about the content of their law might pose one such challenge. We should not 
unnecessarily amplify this challenge for the reasons discussed in Part I. Canadian 
society lacks consensus on all manner of legal and political topics, including the 
issue of which level of government has jurisdiction in any given situation. Yet 
Canadian society continues to function without a foreign nation articulating 
and imposing on it a foreign standard for identifying our jurisdiction-holders. 
Tus, we can look to an Indigenous people’s own legal and political systems 
for resolving such disagreements. Sara Mainville undertakes this important 
work with respect to the Anishinaabe Nation of the Boundary Waters—now 
also known as the Anishinaabe Nation of Treaty Tree—in her contribution 
to this special issue.159 Te cases she discusses involve not internal but rather 
external challenges—by the federal government and industry proponents—to 
the identity of the rights-holder. Mainville highlights the signifcance of an 
Indigenous people’s legal and political processes for developing consensus about 
how to respond to such external challenges. Tis points toward a second potential 
challenge, given Canadian governments’ attempts to undermine Indigenous legal 
156. Ibid at 138. 
157. Calder, supra note 69 at 316, Hall J; Sparrow, supra note 4 at 1098-1099 (citing, 
with approval, Hall J’s analysis of extinguishment in Calder); Van der Peet, supra
note 22 at para 28. 
158. Metallic, supra note 13 at 250; Desautel CA, supra note 28 at para 62. 
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and political processes discussed above.160 Te third challenge discussed in this 
section involves courts’ lack of deference to Indigenous law. 
Our focus thus far has been on non-treaty section 35(1) rights, namely, 
Aboriginal rights and title. Te process for identifying a treaty rights-holder 
is somewhat diferent than that for identifying a non-treaty rights-holder. Put 
simply, the treaty rights-holder is the party to the treaty. We can ask: Who 
entered into the treaty with the Crown? As McNeil explains, the documents and 
records of the treaty provide evidence in answering this question.161 Tat said, 
just as disputes arise regarding the interpretation of substantive treaty provisions, 
disputes can arise regarding the interpretation of treaty evidence about the proper 
rights-holder. For example, who exactly is represented by the signatories to the 
treaty? In such a situation, the approach used in the non-treaty context—namely, 
applying an Indigenous people’s own laws to identify the rights-holder—can 
provide guidance. 
Mainville discusses the function of a Grand Council, which is a spiritual, 
legal, and political institution that provides processes for achieving consensus 
within an Anishinaabe nation.162 A Grand Council negotiated Treaty Tree on 
behalf of the Anishinaabe Nation of the Boundary Waters.163 Mainville explains 
Treaty Tree is a nation-to-nation treaty.164 Te Queen’s treaty commissioners 
insisted on dealing with the Anishinaabeg as a nation in the Treaty Tree 
negotiations.165 Tus, the treaty rights-holder is the Anishinaabe Nation of the 
Boundary Waters, not the many bands imposed on the Nation by the Indian 
Act. Later, colonial mechanisms—including various Indian Act provisions— 
were used to weaken the Grand Council, which was eventually forced to meet 
secretly.166 Grand Council Treaty Tree is the successor to the Grand Council 
who negotiated Treaty Tree.167 
In her article, Mainville draws on knowledge gained through her role as 
past advisor to Grand Council Treaty Tree, through her study of Treaty Tree 
during law school and graduate studies, and through conversations with Treaty 
Tree knowledge holders.168 She explains miinigoziiwin, which is one aspect of 
160. See text accompanying note 6. 
161. McNeil, supra note 16 at 153. 
162. Mainville, supra note 14 at 103. 
163. Kelly 2013, supra note 45 at para 29. 
164. Mainville, supra note 14 at 123. 
165. Ibid at 121. 
166. Ibid at 108. 
167. Kelly 2013, supra note 45 at para 29. 
168. Mainville, supra note 14 at 101-02. 






















Anishinaabe inakonigaawin (Anishinaabe law) and which refers to the inherent 
authority of the Anishinaabeg given by the Creator.169 A key concept related to 
miinigoziiwin is that decision-making should be open to all and not done in secret, 
so that the Nation can be “of one mind” in its decisions.170 Mainville explains two 
protocols recently adopted by the Grand Council to uphold miinigoziiwin prior 
to initiating litigation regarding Treaty Tree.171 
Te frst protocol requires that a community seeking to initiate litigation to 
uphold its Treaty Tree rights must obtain approval by the Grand Council.172 
Te second protocol ensures the transparency of Grand Council decisions.173 
It provides that during the frst two days of the spring and fall Assemblies, 
“the Nation would convene as a National Assembly.” On the third and fnal 
day, the Chiefs in Assembly would meet “to make decisions to implement the 
Nation’s will.”174 Te frst two days of the Assemblies give all members of the 
Nation an opportunity to participate and have a voice in the Grand Council’s 
decision-making. Implementing participatory democracy in this way is a means 
of upholding the Anishinaabe inakonigaawin principle about open decision 
making. We can contrast this approach with the band council governance model 
based on representative democracy.175 Tese two protocols together support the 
goal of ensuring the nation is “of one mind” about Treaty Tree litigation.176 
Te Grand Council complied with these two processes in approving the 
“treaty right to education” case.177 Te Grand Council argued Treaty Tree 
protects a right to education which the Crown breached, for example, by failing 
to provide adequate resources to support quality education and by failing to 
deliver culturally relevant education.178 Te Grand Council sought to bring a 
representative action and to have the Grand Chief of the Grand Council made 
the representative plaintif on behalf of the Anishinaabe Nation of the Boundary 
Waters.179 Te Crown disagreed, arguing the proper rights-holder was not the 
Nation as a whole but rather the twenty-eight individual Indian Act bands which 
169. Ibid at 121-22. 
170. Ibid at 105, 122. 
171. Ibid at 102. 
172. Ibid at 111-12. 
173. Ibid at 113. 
174. Ibid. 
175. See ibid at 112-13. 
176. Ibid at 114. 
177. Ibid at 177. 
178. See ibid at 14; Kelly 2013, supra note 45 at paras 32-35. 
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have been imposed over the Anishinaabe Nation of the Boundary Waters.180 
Te Ontario Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge’s solution, which was 
to attempt to go between the horns of the dilemma by allowing the Grand 
Chief to serve as the representative plaintif of the nation, but only if each of the 
twenty-eight bands passed band council resolutions authorizing the Grand Chief 
to do so.181 Any bands who refused would have to be joined as party defendants 
by the Grand Chief.182 Te courts characterized this decision—which has come 
to be known as a “Kelly order”—as a practical solution to the dilemma of how 
to identify the rights-holder on an interlocutory motion when resolution of the 
issue requires a trial of the treaty claim.183 A Kelly order is meant to ensure all 
putative rights-holders—both the Indigenous nation and the Indian Act bands— 
are parties to the action, avoiding the need to decide between them.184 It should 
be noted, though, that none of the twenty-eight bands claimed to be the proper 
rights-holder; the issue was manufactured by the federal government. Moreover, 
as Mainville explains, a Kelly order is not a mere minor logistical speedbump. 
In the end, the Grand Council was unable to secure the twenty-eight band council 
resolutions.185 Mainville identifes some potential reasons, none of which refect 
an internal dispute about the identity of the proper rights-holder.186 Although it 
was open to the Grand Council to continue the action by suing the bands who 
did not pass resolutions, Mainville explains the problem with this approach in 
the context of a second piece of litigation approved by the Grand Council where 
this same issue arose. 
In the second case, the Grand Council sought judicial review of Ontario’s 
decision to allow the sale of hydro dams.187 Two intervenors in the case sought a 
Kelly order, which would force the Grand Council to sue any of its twenty-eight 
bands who failed to pass the requisite band council resolution.188 As Mainville 
explains, the Grand Council argued Kelly orders are ofensive as they contravene 
Anishinaabe custom, or in other words, laws.189 Being required to sue a segment of 
180. Ibid at para 5. 
181. Ibid at para 121; Kelly CA, supra note 45 at para 21. 
182. Kelly 2013, supra note 45 at para 121; Kelly CA, supra note 45 at para 21. 
183. Kelly 2013, supra note 45 at paras 120-21; Kelly CA, ibid at para 20; Kelly v Ontario (Minister 
of Energy), 2014 ONSC 5492 at paras 1, 3 [Kelly 2014]. 
184. Kelly 2014, ibid at para 38. 
185. Mainville, supra note 14 at 120. 
186. Ibid at 120-21. 
187. Ibid at 118-19. 
188. Kelly 2014, supra note 183 at paras 5, 9. 
189. Mainville, supra note 14 at 118-19; Kelly 2014, supra note 183 at paras 8-9. 







   






one’s own citizens—forcing them into an adversarial process—is hardly conducive 
to generating consensus, upholding miinigoziiwin, and working toward being of 
“one mind.” Recognizing this, the court acknowledged the perception that Kelly
orders “could be used as a divide-and-conquer tactic in civil litigation against 
Aboriginal peoples.”190 Despite this acknowledgement, the court granted the 
intervenors’ motion for a Kelly order.191 Two of the court’s reasons relate to the 
themes of this special issue. 
First, according to the court, the Grand Council’s argument that the 
Anishinaabe Nation is the rights-holder pursuant to Anishinaabe custom or 
law is “no more than a self-serving assertion of something that the court may 
ultimately have to determine.”192 Te court also stated the Grand Council and its 
representative, the Grand Chief, “are not correct simply because they say so.”193 
Here we encounter the third potential challenge to applying Indigenous law in 
identifying the rights-holders: a court’s refusal to defer to Indigenous law. Tis 
court’s lack of deference to the Anishinaabe Nation’s law about its own collective 
identity runs counter to the jurisprudence discussed above, which establishes that 
“the defnition of the proper rights holder is a matter to be determined primarily 
from the viewpoint of the Aboriginal collective itself.”194 In other words, the 
rights-holder is whoever the Indigenous people’s law says is the rights-holder. 
An Indigenous people might not be correct simply because they say so, but 
they are correct because their law says so. We also saw above that deference to 
Indigenous law is required to avoid constitutional capture. As such, it is not 
clear why the court expects to play such a signifcant role in adjudicating this 
issue. Granted, as discussed above, the identity of a treaty rights-holder will 
depend on the historical evidence of who entered into the treaty.195 But evidence 
only has meaning within a normative framework, or in other words, within a 
constitutional order. And avoiding constitutional capture means interpreting 
evidence through the lens of an Indigenous people’s own constitutionalism. 
In reserving a signifcant role for itself, is the court here planning to engage in 
constitutional capture, assuming it will select an a priori standard and assess 
whether the Indigenous people’s political structure meets that standard? Or is the 
court assuming its expertise regarding Anishinaabe inakonigaawin exceeds that of 
190. Ibid at para 9. See also Mainville, supra note 14 at 120. 
191. Kelly 2014, supra note 183 at paras 10, 46. 
192. Ibid at para 34. 
193. Ibid. 
194. Tsilhqot’in Nation CA, supra note 60 at para 149; see text accompanying note 125. 
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the Anishinaabe Nation, such that the court is prepared to claim the Anishinaabe 
Nation’s understanding of its own law is incorrect?196 Both options are untenable. 
Te court’s labelling of the Grand Council’s argument as “self-serving” is puzzling 
given the Grand Council’s argument refects current jurisprudence as well as the 
logical outcome of avoiding constitutional capture. 
Let’s consider the court’s second reason for granting the intervenors’ motion 
for a Kelly order. Te court held the Anishinaabe Nation’s argument that it is the 
rights-holder “has a Shakespearean ‘the lady doth protest too much’ aura to it.”197 
Te motion judge wrote:198 
I do not understand why the Applicants would object to having the 28 Indian 
Bands joined as parties to the Application. If it is true that in accordance with 
Aboriginal customary law that the [Anishinaabe Nation is] the rights holder, then 
the Indian Bands will stand down and not defend the Application but be bound by 
the outcome. 
Tis reasoning is oblivious to the constitutional capture of Indian Act bands whose 
authority is statutory and who are bound by Canadian law, which often conficts 
with Anishinaabe inakonigaawin. For example, the chief and council of an Indian 
Act band owe fduciary duties to the members of their band,199 and not to the 
nation as a whole. Tese fduciary duties include a duty to manage the band’s 
assets in the best interests of the band’s members.200 In most contexts, one hopes 
a compelling argument could be formulated that using a band’s assets to protect 
the Indigenous people’s Aboriginal and treaty rights is in the best interest of the 
band’s membership. Tat said, it is not difcult to imagine a band—struggling 
to provide basic public services and necessities to its members—who deems a test 
case too precarious under the Canadian legal system to risk its severely limited 
band assets on a possible costs award against it. 
Mainville’s paper is especially valuable because it highlights the adversarial 
nature of Canadian procedural law and the “divide and conquer strategy” used 
196. For a discussion of courts’ reluctance to defer to Indigenous law, especially as compared to 
courts’ willingness to defer to foreign law, see Karen Drake, “Indigenous Oral Traditions in 
Court: Hearsay or Foreign Law?” in Drake & Gunn, supra note 23, 281 at 302-304. 
197. Kelly 2014, supra note 183 at para 36. 
198. Ibid at para 37. 
199. Jack Woodward, Native Law (Tomson Reuters Canada Limited, 2019) (loose-leaf revision 
2020, release 3), ch 7 at para 740, citing Williams Lake Indian Band v Abbey, [1992] 4 
CNLR 21 (BCSC) at para 14. 
200. Ibid, ch 7 at para 741, citing Louie v Louie, 2015 BCCA 247; Basil v Lower Nicola Indian 
Band, 2009 FC 741 at para 95; Moon v Campbell River Indian Band, [1997] 1 CNLR 77 
(Fed TD), afrmed (1999), 176 DLR (4th) 254 (Fed CA). 











by the Crown and proponents.201 Tis adversarial approach is in stark contrast 
to the goal of reconciliation, which at the very least denotes a non-adversarial 
relationship.202 More importantly, the Crown’s adversarial approach conficts 
with Anishinaabe inakonigaawin. As Mainville explains, “Treaties are about 
relationships” and “they are not meant to create winners and losers.”203 But the 
Treaty Tree litigation discussed by Mainville “has created even deeper relations 
of animosity with the Crown.”204 
V. WHO SHOULD DECIDE THE IDENTITY OF THE RIGHTS-
HOLDER? 
A fnal theme of this special issue asks: Who should decide the identity of the 
rights-holder? Te discussion thus far demonstrates the perils of leaving this 
issue to the courts. Christie’s analysis reveals how the SCC’s jurisprudence is 
captured by liberalism, which results in rights-holders being characterized as 
mere socio-cultural units instead of political entities. Tis outcome contradicts 
the plain language of section 35, which explicitly identifes rights-holders as 
“peoples,” a term that denotes political entities. Similarly, Metallic’s analysis 
reveals how the courts’ reasoning in R v Bernard is captured by positivism. And 
Mainville argues Treaty Tree is a nation-to-nation treaty that can be altered only 
through the negotiated agreement of the parties,205 and not by courts imposing 
their captured understandings onto the treaty and the parties. 
In his contribution to this special issue, Paul Chartrand argues that the 
identity of a rights-holder is the prerogative of the executive as opposed to the 
judiciary.206 Like Christie, he is concerned with the trend toward judicialization 
of Aboriginal rights provoked by section 35.207 Chartrand is not defending a 
unilateral power of the executive to dictate the identity of rights-holders. Rather, 
he argues constitutional legitimacy depends on consent, and thus the identity 
of rights-holders should be decided through political negotiations between 
political actors, as in the case of historical and modern treaties.208 Chartrand 
highlights the Métis Nation Accord—a component of the 1992 Charlottetown 
201. Mainville, supra note 14 at 122. 
202. See text accompanying notes 21-24. 
203. Mainville, supra note 14 at 121-22. 
204. Ibid at 106. 
205. Ibid at 26. 
206. Chartrand, supra note 17 at 3. 
207. Ibid at 177-79; Christie, supra note 9 at 4-5. 
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Accord—which was the result of political negotiations and which included a 
defnition of the Métis Nation. Although the Charlottetown Accord was defeated 
in a referendum, it had the consent of the federal government, all provincial 
governments, and the Métis Nation. More recently, the Métis Nation of Alberta, 
the Métis Nation-Saskatchewan, and the Métis Nation of Ontario each entered 
into a Métis Government Recognition and Self-Government Agreement with 
Canada. Pursuant to these agreements, Canada recognizes that each of the 
Métis government signatories is mandated to represent the Métis collectivity 
comprising its citizens.209 
Te federal government’s Recognition and Implementation of Indigenous 
Rights Framework also envisions a role for the executive in identifying 
rights-holders. Itproposes that the Minister of Crown–Indigenous Relations, on the 
advice of an advisory committee or institution, would make recommendations to 
the Governor in Council regarding the recognition of Indigenous rights-holders; 
the Governor in Council would then add the rights-holders to a schedule of 
legislation to be developed pursuant to the Framework.210 
Chartrand’s argument is also infuenced by courts’ deference to state 
practice. Te executive recognizes foreign states by entering into ofcial relations 
with them, and courts defer to this recognition.211 Analogizing from states’ 
recognition of each other, some argue Indigenous peoples’ recognition of other 
Indigenous peoples is an essential element of the identifcation of Indigenous 
peoples.212 Tis approach has the beneft of ensuring Indigenous peoples are not 
dependent on the state for their recognition. It could also forestall the problem 
of non-Indigenous individuals forming organizations and falsely claiming to be 
an Indigenous people.213 A recent example of recognition of Indigenous peoples 
by other Indigenous peoples is provided by the Joint Declaration executed on 16 
January 2020 by the Métis Nation of Alberta, the Métis Nation-Saskatchewan, 
209. See e.g. Métis Government Recognition and Self-Government Agreement between Métis Nation of 
Ontario and Canada, 17 June 2019, ss 2.02, 3.01, 1.01, online (pdf ): Métis Nation of Ontario 
<www.metisnation.org/media/655331/2019-06-27-metis-government-recognition-and-self-
government-agreement.pdf> [perma.cc/M24V-PQND]. 
210. “Overview of a Recognition and Implementation of Indigenous Rights Framework” (last 
modifed 10 September 2018), online: Government of Canada <www.rcaanc-cirnac.gc.ca/ 
eng/1536350959665/1539959903708> [perma.cc/H884-Q6LH]. 
211. Chartrand, supra note 206 at 182. 
212. Joshua Castellino & Cathal Doyle, “Who Are ‘Indigenous Peoples’? An Examination of 
Concepts Concerning Group Membership in the UNDRIP” in Hohmann & Weller, supra
note 94, 7 at 19. 
213. See Darryl Leroux, Distorted Descent: White Claims to Indigenous Identity (University of 
Manitoba Press, 2019). 














and the Métis Nation of Ontario.214 Each signatory of the Joint Declaration 
recognizes that the three Métis governments are “the only Métis-created and 
legitimate representative governments of rights-bearing Métis citizens in Alberta, 
Saskatchewan and Ontario.”215 
Jason Madden’s contribution to this special issue also highlights the 
signifcance of negotiations in identifying the rights-holder. As Madden explains, 
in Powley, the Supreme Court of Canada rejected Ontario’s argument that it was 
justifed in denying Métis rights because identifying Métis rights-holders was 
too difcult.216 In so doing, the Court slayed a dragon of Métis rights-denial, 
as Madden puts it.217 And yet, this dragon has reared its head again in Fort 
Chipewyan Métis Nation of Alberta Local #125 v Alberta.218 Madden argues 
that the SCC’s conclusion in Powley entails a duty on Crown governments to 
negotiate with an Indigenous people to identify the proper rights-holder when 
a prima facie Aboriginal right exists.219 Te alternative is the illogical result from 
Fort Chipewyan, where a prima facie Aboriginal right exists, and yet there is no 
rights-holder, rendering the right hollow.220 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Te papers in this collection demonstrate the need for compulsory Indigenous and 
Aboriginal law content within law school curricula. With respect to Aboriginal 
law, Metallic’s analysis reveals a wide discrepancy between well-established 
SCC jurisprudence and the lower courts’ reasoning in R v Bernard. As Metallic 
notes, “One possible reason is that the Aboriginal rights test—including how 
it interacts with the treaty rights, Aboriginal title, and Métis rights tests—is 
overly complex and confusing, especially for judges who likely did not study 
this area in law school or practice in this area.”221 Similarly, as Christie’s article 
demonstrates, despite the Court’s commitment to giving equal weight to the 
214. Joint Declaration: Métis Nation of Alberta Provincial Council, Métis Nation-Saskatchewan 
Provincial Métis Council, Provisional Council of the Métis Nation of Ontario, 16 January 
2020, online (pdf ): Métis Nation of Ontario <www.metisnation.org/media/655544/ 
joint-declaration-mna-mns-mno.pdf> [perma.cc/22NA-9LS5] [Joint Declaration]. 
215. Ibid at 1 [emphasis in original]. 
216. Madden, supra note 20 at 200. 
217. Ibid. 
218. 2016 ABQB 713 [Fort Chipewyan]. 
219. Madden, supra note 20 at 226-27. 
220. Ibid at 201. 
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“Aboriginal perspective,”222 its section 35 jurisprudence is captured by liberalism 
insofar as it characterizes rights-holders as mere social-cultural entities instead of 
political entities. Turning to Indigenous law, McNeil explains that Indigenous 
peoples’ own law determines the identity of the rights-holder. And yet, as McNeil 
recognizes, “Canadian judges are generally unfamiliar with Indigenous law and 
cannot access it through conventional legal research.”223 And Mainville’s article 
illustrates how the “divide and conquer” approach adopted by the Crown and 
proponents, and upheld by the Court, generated not reconciliation but deep 
animosity within a treaty relationship. Mainville advocates for treaty councils 
as a form of dispute resolution; these Indigenous law institutions would help 
balance the relationship between Indigenous peoples and Crown governments.224 
Although Adrien Habermacher’s article was not part of the workshop that 
generated this special issue, it makes a valuable contribution to the ongoing 
discussion about indigenizing Canadian law schools. It provides empirical data 
on the attitudes of individual faculty members at three Canadian law schools 
on three topics: (1) Territory acknowledgements; (2) Indigenous content in law 
school curricula including mandatory courses; and (3) Recruitment of Indigenous 
faculty members and students.225 Ascertaining the rationales underlying obstinacy 
toward these topics, especially the latter two, is key to addressing that obstinacy. 
As Senator Murray Sinclair, former Chair of the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, has said on many occasions, “education got us into this mess and 
education will get us out of it.”226 
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